
The insurrectionary captaincy: the declaration of war against the Southern Gê by D. João VI's Court and the preparation of the Royal Expedition of Conquest of their territories in the Koran-bang-rê – Campos de Guarapuava (1774 -1810)

A capitania insurrecta: a declaração de guerra contra os Jê do Sul pela Corte Joanina e a preparação da Real Expedição para a conquista dos seus territórios nos Koran-bang-rê – Campos de Guarapuava (1774 -1810)

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Abstract

This reflection aims to demonstrate that the Indigenous groups who lived in the territories in the stretch that goes from the south of the Captaincy of São Paulo to the Captaincy of São Pedro do Rio Grande do Sul, were insurgent and defended their territories against invaders. The Xokleng were found in the territories adjacent to Viamão road, from Campos de Lages to the vicinity of Vila do Príncipe, currently the city of Lapa PR, while the Kaingang occupied the east causing insecurity among cattle drivers, and endangering farms and villages in Campos Gerais do Paraná and Campos de Itapetininga reaching Sorocaba in São Paulo. It also seeks to elucidate that the Royal Charter of 11/05/1808 was the D. João VI's court reaction to this state of war on the borders of the occupation, while the Royal Charter of 04/01/1809 was a meticulously traced plan for the Royal Expedition of Conquest of Guarapuava to occupy the Kaingang territories in the Campos de Guarapuava.

Keywords: Indigenous Ethnohistory; Kaingang Indigenous Peoples; Conquest of Guarapuava; Royal Charters; Sociocultural relations.

Resumo

Essa reflexão visa demonstrar que os grupos indígenas que viviam nos territórios ao Sul da capitania de São Paulo até a capitania de São Pedro do Rio Grande do Sul estavam insurrectos e defendiam seus territórios contra os invasores. Os Xokleng nos territórios adjacentes à Estrada do Viamão, desde os Campos de Lages até as proximidades da Vila do Príncipe, hoje cidade

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da Lapa/PR; e os Kaingang com incursões cada vez mais a leste, causando insegurança nos tropeiros e pondo em perigo as fazendas e vilas nos Campos Gerais do Paraná e nos Campos de Itapetininga até Sorocaba, em São Paulo. Também procura elucidar a Carta Régia de 05/11/1808 como uma reação da Corte Joanina a esse estado de guerra nas fronteiras da ocupação; e evidenciar a Carta Régia de 01/04/1809, como um plano minuciosamente traçado para que a Real Expedição de Conquista de Guarapuava ocupasse os territórios Kaingang nos Campos de Guarapuava.

Palavras-chave: Etno-história indígena; Índios Kaingang; Conquista de Guarapuava; Cartas Régias; Relações socioculturais.

Introduction

On the main road entering the city of Guarapuava, at Manoel Ribas Avenue, there is a large statue of Colonel Diogo Pinto de Azevedo Portugal on his horse. That monument was one way the local authorities found to pay a homage to the commander of the Royal Expedition of Conquest of Guarapuava during the celebration of the 200 years of the arrival of such expedition in those fields¹. Walter Benjamin wrote that “there has never been a monument of culture that was not also a monument of barbarism” (BENJAMIN, 1987, p. 225). Monuments are part of the winners’ narrative, thus, glorifying and celebrating their “heroes” is inherent in the memory construction (NORA, 1983). In this specific case, it is a memory that seeks to hide the violent historical process of occupation and conquer of indigenous territories in the Campos de Guarapuava, which were occupied and named by the Kaingang tribe as *Koran-bang-rê*².

The greed for these territories was caused by the expansion plans devised by the São Paulo Captaincy and the rural elite of the 5th District of Curitiba and Paranaguá in the mid XVIII century. The most complex and organized attempt to occupy the indigenous territories in Guarapuava, up to that point, had occurred during the government of Luís António de Sousa Botelho Mourão, also known as Morgado de Mateus, governor of the São Paulo

¹ For further details about this monument, see Durat (2019, p. 21-23).

² Telêmaco Borba (1908, p. 118), in *Atualidade indígena*, wrote that the Campos de Guarapuava were named *Côranbang-rê* by the Kaingang. *Coran* = day or light, *bang* = large, *rê* = field: light and large field. According to the ABA Convention for the spelling of tribal names, we substituted c with k and adopted the spelling *Koran-bang-rê*.

Captaincy³. Between 1768 and 1774, he had sent several military expeditions, commanded by the lieutenant-colonel Afonso Botelho, to conquer indigenous territories that were located west of the Viamão Road. However, Botelho's troops were expelled from those territories by the Kaingang⁴.

The defeat of Botelhos' troops by the Kaingang tribe in 1774 started a situation of war on the occupation borders. The rural elite of the 5th District, who was amassing a fortune at the time with the commercialization of the cattle brought from the South and sold in Sorocaba/SP, saw their businesses being threatened by lack of security on the roads and in villages. They demanded a war against the insurrectionary indigenous that attacked farms, villages, and the cattle drivers, the capture or expulsion of insurgent groups, and wanted to conquer and incorporate their territories into new *sesmarias*.

Such situation led the government of the São Paulo Captaincy to defend in Court an invasion plan to conquer the indigenous territories of the south and southeast of the captaincy. This new attempt met the commercial and expansionist interests of the rural elite of the 5th District of Curitiba and Paranaguá, and those of the farmers of the São Paulo Captaincy. It was also in agreement with the Court plans to regulate the taxation of the gains generated by the cattle business coming from the south, and defend the empire borders in that region. This also created the possibility of finding new mines of precious stones in the Tibagi river.

Such demands presented to the Prince Regent Dom João VI resulted in the Royal Charter of 5th November 1808, which declared a war against the Kaingang, and five months later, in the Royal Charter of 1st April 1809, presenting a detailed plan to conquer the Kaingang territories in the Campos de Guarapuava (BRASIL, 1891).

Seeking to understand the declaration of war against the indigenous people in Minas Gerais and São Paulo by Prince Dom João in 1808, Fernanda Sposito explained that such policy "represented a setback considering more peaceful attempts to subject the indigenous tribes to the Portuguese Empire", that author also pointed out that "D. João VI's Royal Charters against the indigenous people in Minas Gerais and São Paulo were a huge setback"

³ For further information about the government of Morgado de Mateus, see Belotto (1979).

⁴ About the expeditions led by the lieutenant-colonel Afonso Botelho de S. Paio e Souza in indigenous territories in the captaincy of São Paulo, in the XVIII century, see the documents published in the Proceedings of the National Library, v. 76, 1956 (SOUZA, 1956). Gloria Kok (2004) recorded some aspects of such expeditions, focusing on the publication of series of 37 watercolors by Joaquim J. de Miranda, which illustrate the events of the 10th expedition led by Afonso Botelho in 1771.

(SPOSITO, 2009, p. 86; 107) when compared to the indigenous policy set by the King D. José I and implemented by the Marquis de Pombal. She ascribes that “setback” to the crisis of the “Portugal’s Old Regime” (SPOSITO, 2009, p. 86-87). While, Pombal’s policy in the old regime aimed at the ‘co-optation and control of indigenous populations living in the border regions” and the transformation of native populations into Portuguese as a way to “guarantee the Portuguese ownership of those places”, D. João VI’s policy “did not seek to attract the indigenous populations, but rather remove them from those impenetrable regions, making them slaves, or even killing them,” (SPOSITO, 2009, p. 99).

According to Almeida (2008), the Portuguese Court indigenous policy varied from region to region. In areas of recent colonization, there were “*descimentos*”, a type of capture of the native population to start new tribes, and when the indigenous people resisted, a war was declared against them, such as the one described in the discussion proposed in this study. In areas of old colonization, tribes were extinguished, and the indigenous land was taken by the Court. Almeida (2012) also reported that the war declaration against the Botocudos in Minas Gerais and the Kaingangs in São Paulo “did not mean deep rupture with the previous policies”, that war situation was already established before the arrival of D. João VI’s court in Brazil, and that in “the XIX century, those indigenous people still had to defend their land and tribes” (ALMEIDA, 2012, p. 25-26).

To understand the war declaration against the indigenous population of the São Paulo Captainty by D. João VI in November 1808, one must verify the already existing war situation along the Viamão road up to the Campos de Vacaria in the Captainty of São Pedro do Rio Grande, and reaching Sorocaba, in São Paulo. The Captainty of São Paulo was insurrectionary, there were combats between the indigenous groups and the dwellers of villages and farms, attacks to travelers, militias were organized by farmers to attack the tribes, and troops were assembled in the main villages of the captainty to react to possible indigenous attacks. We understand that even in the old regime, in Pombal’s period, there was already an ongoing war against the indigenous population on the borders of the occupation in the southwestern part of the captainty.

Thus, the main objective of this reflection is to demonstrate that the indigenous groups living in the territories in the South of the captainty São Pedro do Rio Grande do Sul were insurrectionary and defended their

territory against invaders. Another aim is to evidence that the Royal Charter of 05/11/1808 was a reaction by D. João VI's Court to the warfare situation on the borders of the occupation. We also address the Royal Charter of 01/04/1809 as a thoroughly devised plan of the rural elite of the 5th District along with the authorities of the Captaincy of São Paulo, with the approval of D. João VI's Court, to conquer the Kaingang territories in the Campos de Guarapuava (BRASIL, 1891).

We propose to develop this reflection based on the indigenous history principles, which consider indigenous individuals as social subjects acting in historical processes, as pointed out by John Monteiro as a twofold challenge:

On the one hand, the historian must rescue the historical role of native actors in the formation of the continent societies and cultures, [...]. On the other hand, and which seems to be far more complex, it is necessary to rethink the meaning of history from the experience and memory of the populations that did not record – or recorded very little of – their past using writing (MONTEIRO, 1995, p. 227).

This entails the challenge of rewriting history including indigenous peoples as proactive socio-historical subjects, and the methodological challenge of finding out about indigenous actions in a past marked by sources that did not record their presence or agency, or rather excluded and erased them deliberately.

For this reason,

It is not enough to characterize historical indigenous individuals simply as victims that watched passively their own destruction [...]. It is paramount to rescue the historical subjects that acted according to their view of the world around them, a reading that was informed by both the cultural codes of their society and their individual perception and interpretation of the events that occurred (MONTEIRO, 1999, p. 248).

We also intend to point out that the indigenous' protagonism acted in a "set of relations established between the indigenous peoples and other actors and social forces interacting with them" (PACHECO DE OLIVEIRA, 2016, p. 7), in a specific "historical situation". The events analyzed in this study include the war on the borders of the occupation, in a context of expansionist actions by the rural elites to reach new grazing areas in the west of the Viamão road

and the resumption of “just wars” by the colonial state with the arrival of the Portuguese Court in Brazil.

We surveyed the documents filed in the *Arquivo Público de São Paulo* (Public Archive of São Paulo), focusing on the collection named *Documentos Interessantes* (Interesting Documents). We also surveyed the *Arquivo Público do Paraná* (Public Archive of Parana) and the files of the Municipal Council of Castro, in Paraná and the Municipal Councils of Itapetininga and Sorocaba, in São Paulo. We examined the work of regional memorialists that provided us with relevant information to understand the history of that region of the captaincy of São Paulo. Another relevant source was the ethnoknowledge preserved in the oral tradition of the Kaingang tribes who live in the indigenous area neighboring the Campos de Guarapuava, which helped to clarify the local toponymy. We are thankful to all of them⁵.

The Insurrectionary Captaincy: from Lages to Sorocaba

Encouraged by the expulsion of Afonso Botelho’s troops from the *Korambang-rê* in 1774, the Kaingang started to enter some farms and villages close to the way to Viamão, where the cattle drivers used to travel on their way from Campos da Vacaria/RS to the animal market in Sorocaba/SP. The territories along that road became more and more dangerous over time. The Xokleng tribes acted in the slopes of the Serra do Mar, from the Pelotas river (RS) to the Registro river (Iguaçu) (PR); while the Kaingang tribes spread throughout the Campos de Lages (SC), and to the north of Rio Iguaçu (PR) up to Sorocaba/SP.

In November 1782, the alferes Manoel da Fonseca Paes wrote to the governor of the captaincy of São Pedro do Rio Grande reporting the Xokleng’s attacks to the Campos de Lages, in the neighborhood called Lagoinha, located 2 leagues away from the Curitibaanos farm. The number of deaths there totaled “four people, namely, a man that was found first”, his horse had been wounded by an arrow and after the man fell down, he was beaten to death. Next, the indigenous men followed the wounded horse up to Luiz Felix’s home. He tried to flee from there, but when he realized that his wife and two daughters had been captured, he returned home and was killed along with his wife and “one of the daughters, who was also killed after her hair had been cut and her head skin removed with part of the hair, for being really fair; the older daughter, who was said to be around nine years old was captured and taken

⁵ About the incorporation of indigenous ethnoknowledge and their oral traditions in historical analyses, see the syntheses published by Jorge E. de Oliveira (2003), Thiago Cavalcante (2011) and Lúcio T. Mota (2014).

to the indigenous group accommodation area, since she was really beautiful and also had blonde hair” (DI, 31:14)⁶.

The attacks continued in the following year, and in March 1783, they invaded abandoned warehouses and got all the corn they found there. The population was terrorized, and fled from their farms to the closest villages to scape new invasions. In a letter, the vice-king asked the governor of São Paulo to put some effort to guarantee the “peace to that people and stop the current hostility”. This meant to “expel those barbarians from the confining sites between the limits of the captaincies of São Paulo and the Rio Grande continent”.

It was necessary to keep the peace and quiet of farmers and cattle drivers who traveled on the Viamão road. The order received from the general government was sent by the governor of the captaincy of São Paulo to the captain of Lages and determined that he should reach the indigenous tribes and “reduce our friendship”. If the indigenous groups did not agree with that, the captain should destroy their tribes and make them go away. If they made prisoners, they should send them to the capital city of São Paulo (DI, 85:28). Despite these orders, the threaten and attacks to farms, villages, and cattle drivers in the Campos de Lages continued throughout the late XVIII and early XIX centuries.

The same order was sent to the captain of Curitiba village, because the danger of indigenous attacks was getting closer to the Campos de Curitiba and the Campos Gerais. The cavalry captain of the Curitiba village wrote to the captaincy governor about the invasions promoted by the indigenous tribes in the region and about the “the danger to which the dwellers were exposed” (DI, 85:56). More precisely, Lourenço Ribeiro de Andrade, who was the captain of Curitiba village, informed the captaincy governor that in the place called Santo António da Lapa, some residents had left their property behind due to the closeness of the “angry native people”, who invaded houses “killed pigs and hens, and took all tools, including door handles and locks” (ANDRADE, 1794).

Despite the recommendations by the captaincy governor of not using “brute force” to displace the indigenous population from their tribes and expel them away from the villages and farms, the captain of Curitiba informed that to fulfill those orders “gunpowder and bullets” would be necessary,

⁶ DOCUMENTOS INTERESSANTES PARA A HISTÓRIA E COSTUMES DE S. PAULO. São Paulo, State Archive Storage. Hereinafter referred to as: DI, volume: pages.

which the governor was already sending to the Villages of Lages and Castro (ANDRADE, 1794).

Years later, on 19th October 1808, the captain of the Príncipe village, currently the city of Lapa/PR, notified the president of the captaincy of São Paulo, Antônio José da França e Horta, of the indigenous groups' attacks to several farms in the village, and asked a supply of gunpowder, bullets, and rifles, so that he could prepare troops to expel the indigenous groups that spread all over the region where the cattle drivers had to pass with the cattle they brought from the captaincy of São Pedro do Rio Grande do Sul. In the late January 1809, França e Horta replied that:

Regarding the indigenous people, you have already received my letter of 30th December last year in which I told you that our king decided to declare war against the indigenous tribes, and approve the action of "Bandeiras" without public funds, so that those that captured indigenous groups could keep them as slaves for 15 years, and for this reason no more gunpowder, bullets, or rifles shall be sent at the expense of the government. RI (DI, 58:83).

However, at the time the captain asked arms and ammunition to expel the native people from his village, he did not know that just some days later, on 5th November 1808, D. João VI would publish a Royal Charter declaring war against the indigenous population of the captaincy of São Paulo.

In the Campos Gerais, north of the Registro river (Iguaçu) up to the Itararé river, the Kaingang people tried by all means to keep their territories. They preserved the memories of that past time of fights and resistance and narrated it to Telêmaco Borba:

These indigenous individuals say that their forefathers occupied the territories of the current Districts of Castro and Guarapuava, from where they directed their attacks to the inhabitants of the borders of the backland, to the cattle drivers, and to the travelers that used the Rio Grande do Sul Road (BORBA, 1908, p. 5).

From their tribes at the Tibagi river valley, they attacked farms and cattle drivers who traveled on the Campos Gerais Road. The captain of the Yapó Cavalry (Castro), Francisco Carneiro Lobo, was informed that the governor Martim Lopes Lobo de Saldanha was planning to expel the indigenous groups from the margins of the Viamão Road. "At that time, when measures were being taken, they seemed to be the best option to react to the insults of the

Bugres tribes that were accommodated in the location called Agudos, on the banks of Tabagy⁷ river” (DI, 83:172).

The war fought by the Kaingang tribe in the Campos Gerais continued even after the conquest of Guarapuava in 1810. Fragments of the conflict were described by Auguste de Saint-Hilaire when he traveled throughout the Paraná province in 1820. He recorded that the places where people died were marked by crosses on the Boa Vista farm, close to the Jaguariaíva river and that at that point “several people had been slaughtered by the indigenous groups” (SAINT-HILAIRE, 1964, p. 42). The owner of Jaguariaíva farm, colonel Luciano Carneiro, complained that the indigenous people who attacked the residents became more and more daring. “They had recently invaded the fields in the Colonel’s property, killed some horses, and eaten their meat, which had never happened before” (SAINT-HILAIRE, 1964, p. 42).

The Kaingang’s audacity reached the doors of the well-guarded farm that belonged to colonel Luciano Carneiro, in response the colonel started to organize soldier troops to chase the Kaingang groups, one of them was witnessed by Saint-Hilaire.

Few days before my arrival in Jaguariaíba, they (indigenous groups) were seen near the house. The colonel immediately called some soldiers to chase them. I was just some hours away from the farm when eight men came on their horses, ready to march against the enemies on the following day (SAINT-HILAIRE, 1964, p. 42).

Traveling south, Saint-Hilaire arrived at the Fortaleza farm, which belonged to José Felix da Silva and was one of the oldest and most prosperous properties in the Campos Gerais, from there he wrote: “They (indigenous groups) frequently promoted some disturbance there; they were chased, some men were killed, and their women and children were kidnapped. The slaves working for Mr. José Félix would never go to their work in the field without taking firearms with them” (SAINT-HILAIRE, 1964, p. 60).

He described the insecurity felt due to the dead relatives, which made people leave the region and that the farmers had to run the risk of arming their slaves or otherwise let them be killed by the indigenous groups. At

⁷ Translator’s note: Some proper names (places and people) will be found throughout the text and in specific quotations with different spellings. This is due to the fact that the sources used in this research date back to the time of events and where therefore written in archaic Brazilian Portuguese. To preserve the richness of the source text, the translated version of the article kept the original spelling of the names, at the author’s discretion.

the same time, farmers reacted and organized troops of soldiers to chase indigenous groups that dared to attack their farms. Saint-Hilaire talked to some men who were summoned to chase the Kaingang people and found out that they were experienced in combatting and could follow the clues left behind by the indigenous groups up to the location of their tribes. When they found a tribe, they would surprise them with mass shootings that would kill adult native men and next they would imprison women and children. The indigenous individuals that managed to escape would organize themselves to ambush the attackers and rescue their relatives. The report provided by the soldiers to Saint-Hilaire revealed a war between the Kaingang groups and farmers on the borders of the occupation of Campos Gerais, in the first two decades of the XIX century.

Going further to the north, in the Itapeva and Itapetininga fields, the war was also being fought at the limits of the occupation. The Itapetininga council reported to the governor on 14th April 1793, the hostility of the indigenous groups on farms in that village, “[...] where in the last few months some men had been killed on the Guarehy farms”. The indigenous’ attacks to the farms, which resulted in “great losses” to the Court, were making them desert, and the population also abandoned villages and parish organizations along the road. The councilmen of Itapetininga had to alert the authorities that due to the danger of being killed, cattle drivers were abandoning their activities, “prioritizing their lives to the detriment of the profit of their work” (DI, 45:363-364), which would cause even more losses to the captaincy tax collection.

The events occurred on the Guarehy farms were also reported to the governor of the captaincy by the Sorocaba councilmen, who indicated that the villages and districts were “surrounded by that cruel enemy” (DI, 45:361). In addition to the notification, the rural elite of São Paulo suggested “urgent measures” to stop the indigenous attacks. Despite the São Paulo troops’ vast experience in the war against indigenous peoples, which had been acquired in their alliances with the groups of the São Paulo plateau and accumulated since the first expeditions of the XVI century⁸, the solution proposed by the councilmen of Itapetininga and Itu village was to gather “fifty peaceful indigenous individuals from Goiás” who would be paid by the farmers to fight the war on the borders. The news had repercussion in the Itu council because many attacked farms belonged to farmers that lived in that village (DI,

⁸ About the art of fighting a war at the time of *Entradas* and *Bandeiras*, see Holanda (1957; 1990); discussion resumed by Pedro Puntoni (1999; 2002; 2004).

45:361-363). One of the advantages foreseen by the Itu councilmen of bringing indigenous troops hired in Goiás was the fact that they did not require food supply during the time they were fighting against the local tribes, since they were autonomous and sustainable while working in the fields and woods of the captaincy.

In addition, indigenous people do not need to take food supplies with them, since they can use their arrows to hunt whatever they can eat and provide for themselves for days, months, and years. Our troops on the contrary, even in a small number of men, they need to take a lot of supplies in large carriages, which do not enter easily in those woods where they need to go to find those little (indigenous) accommodations (DI, 45:361-363).

Ten years passed and the indigenous troops from Goiás never arrived, while the Kaingang attacks continued. At the end of 1804, Kaingang groups promoted some disturbance again in the neighborhood of Itapeva village, and the governor of São Paulo instructed the sergeant to attack them before they could repeat their aggressions (DI, 56:118-119)⁹.

When the Court arrived in Rio de Janeiro, D. João VI was informed that the “Campos de Curitiba and Guarapuava” were totally abandoned, “infested by indigenous tribes called Bugres, which killed cruelly all farmers and landowners” (Carta Régia de 05/11/1808) (BRASIL, 1891). This diagnosis was delivered to him by the authorities of the captaincy of São Paulo who visited him in 1808. This made him launch the Royal Charter of 05/11/1808. Next, D. João VI informed the governor of São Paulo that as soon as he received the Charter, he should “consider the war against the barbarian indigenous groups started”. He also instructed the governor of the captaincy of São Paulo to organize voluntary militia groups without expenses to the Royal revenue and authorized the capture of indigenous individuals as “war prisoners”, for a period of 15 years (Carta Régia de 05/11/1808) (BRASIL, 1891).

A month after the publication of the Royal Charter of 05/11/1808, the governor França e Horta issued orders to the colonels of militias in Sorocaba and Curitiba, instructing them to take measures to stop the indigenous attacks in the districts under their jurisdiction (DI, 58:36). He also ordered the colonel of the militia in the Paranaguá village to help the inhabitants of

⁹The conflicts between indigenous groups and the invader populations in the region of Itapetinga and Itapeva continued throughout the XIX century. For the post-independence period up to the Regulation of Catechesis and Civilization Missions to indigenous tribes in 1845, see Fernanda Sposito (2012).

the Itapetininga, Paranapanema, and other villages that were being attacked (DI, 58:69-70). In the following year, new expeditions to chase Kaingang groups were organized in the districts of Itapetininga and Itapeva (DI, 58:102). In one of those expeditions called *bandeiras*, some indigenous individuals were brought together as interpreters in the Royal Expedition of Conquest of Guarapuava, which was already an ongoing project.

Soon after the arrival of the D. João VI Court to Brazil, the captaincy of São Paulo was insurrectionary, and the indigenous initiatives of fighting back the invaders of their territories had been occurring from the Lajes village, going throughout the Campos Gerais in Paraná, and reaching the Itapetininga fields, close to Sorocaba in São Paulo. That was the war on the borders of the occupation of indigenous territories.

The interests of the rural elites of the 5th District of Curitiba and Paranaguá in the expansion of their *sesmarias*

In such a war context on the borders of the occupation, the planning and organization of a new attempt to occupy the vast indigenous territories started west of the Viamão road, in the 5th District of Curitiba and Paranaguá. The invasion and conquest of *Koran-bang-rê – Campos de Guarapuava*, in which Afonso Botelho's troops had failed in the period between 1769 and 1774, was never removed from the agenda of the government of the captaincy of São Paulo. The effort made by the empire authorities and those of the captaincy of São Paulo focused on the tax collection that the cattle drivers' businesses represented to the captaincy and the Court¹⁰, along with the expansion of the large rural properties that raised cattle in new territories to be stolen from the indigenous population, which could increase the tax collection.

In February 1797, the colonel Manoel Gonçalves Guimarães, a rich businessman and farmer from the Curitiba village, was awarded with the property of a three square leagues *sesmaria*, which was the equivalent to 4.356

¹⁰ It has been estimated that between 1780 and 1800 an average of around 10,000 mules passed through Sorocaba per year, while between 1800 and 1826, the annual average increased to 20,000 mules a year. In 1813, São Paulo collected 22:656\$532 (Twenty-two *contos*, six hundred and Fifty-six thousand thirty-two *reis*) [*contos de reis was the Brazilian currency at the time*] from the tax charged of the mules that entered the Sorocaba market. In 1799, the average price of a mule was 10\$000 (ten thousand *reis*), a foal would cost 5\$000, and an ox would have the same price, that is, 5\$000 (PINTO, 1799). Three years later, in 1802, a mule would cost 16\$000 (sixteen thousand *reis*); in 1808, that price had increased to 20\$000; and in the mid-XIX century, that price had seen a three-fold increase reaching 50\$00 (MOREIRA, 1975, p. 831-832; 837). For further data on the flow and price of animals traded in Sorocaba in the first three decades of the XIX century, see Petrone (1976).

hectares, between the rivers Almas and Imbituva, where he was also a business partner in another *sesmaria*. In that field region located in the southwestern part of the Ponta Grossa village, there were another five *sesmarias*, which were under constant threat of Kaingang attacks and due to that, in the early 1805, the governor of the captaincy of São Paulo approached two subjects with the lieutenant-colonel Manoel Gonçalves Guimaraes. The first was the “construction of the road to Lages village”, and the second was the “the conquest, or better, the civilization of the Native People of Garapuava, about whom I expect you will send me convenient information after getting well-informed of all circumstances for the execution of one and another actions” (DI, 56:153). Colonel Manoel Guimaraes’ interest, as a businessman and trader, was to hire the maintenance of the Viamão road together with the São Paulo government, and as a farmer, to expand his property from the west of that road to the Kaingang territories in Guarapuava.

The effort to expand the farms located in the west of the Estrada das Tropas (Troops road) was not only made by colonel Guimaraes, but rather by the whole rural elite established in the Campos Gerais, the owners of *sesmarias*, who lived in Curitiba village and on the Paraná coast, as well as the farmers from São Paulo who owned land in the 5th District. The governor França e Horta approved this expansion which would result in new income for his captaincy vaults. He understood that it was time to implement new actions to occupy the large indigenous territories in the southwestern part of the captaincy and build up new farms there. For that job, men that were “lovers of glory and interested in the increase of the state” (DI, 56:153) such as colonel Manoel Gonçalves, in the governor França e Horta’s opinion suited perfectly¹¹.

¹¹ When discussing the issue of the indigenous displacement in Guarapuava, Ferreira Júnior (2011, p. 66), saw the distribution of the Kaingang territories in Guarapuava as a “gift” by the Court to, “people that would face the challenge, and the risks of the colonizing task”. However, we understand that the land distribution was already part of the Royal Expedition planning, rather than a gift by the Court.

Chart 1. Expansion of sesmarias to the west and southwest of Ponta Grossa village, on the left margin of the Tibagi River in the XVIII century

Owner	Location	Area in leagues	Area in Hectares	Date of concession
Francisco Jeronymo de Carvalho	Imbituva river with Tibagi river	1 x 1	4,356	13/03/1726
Francisco Silva Xavier	Between the rivers Guaraúna and Imbituva	1 x 1 ^{1/2}	6,334	17/01/1735
João Chrisostomo Salgado	Between the rivers Guaraúna and Imbituva	2 x 2	17,424	23/10/1783
Manoel Gonçalves Guimarães e Francisco Luiz de Oliveira	Source of the rivers Guaraúna and Imbituva	2 ^{1/2} x 1	10,890	27/05/1789
Manoel Gonçalves Guimaraes	Almas river up to the point where it meets Imbituva river	3 x 3	39,204	20/02/1797
Joaquim Carneiro Lobo	West of Imbituva river	3 x 3	39,204	18/06/1798

Source: the author¹².

The Royal Charter of 05/11/1808 and its repercussion in the captaincy of São Paulo

Installed in Rio de Janeiro from March 1808 onwards, D. João VI started to receive the province delegations that came to greet the royal family and present their complaints and demands. Representatives of the captaincy of São Paulo informed D. João VI of the fearful situation faced by the populations of the villages and farms located along the roads where the cattle was driven and the need for efficient measures against the indigenous groups.

The Royal Charter of 5th November 1808, which declared war against the Kaingang, was the Court's response to the situation in the captaincy of São Paulo¹³. It described the "almost total abandonment of Campos de Curitiba and

¹² About the *sesmarias*, see the *Repertório das sesmarias concedidas pelos capitães gerais da capitania de São Paulo*, from 1721 to 1821. Vol. IV. São Paulo: Typ do Globo, 1944; and Ritter (1980).

¹³ Before this Charter, the Court had already issued, on 13/05/1808, the Royal Charter to the Governor and Captain of the Captaincy of Minas Gerais about the war against the Botocudos's tribe in Rio Doce, in the east of Minas and Espírito Santo; and another Royal Charter, of 24/8/1808, about the offensive war against the Botocudos' tribes – authorizing the increase in the number of soldiers for that war. For the war against the indigenous tribes in the south of Bahia, at that time, see Cancela (2018). For D. João VI's

Guarapuava” and that they were “infested by the indigenous groups called Bugres”, who attacked and killed the farm residents, threatened the travelers and traders, who could only travel on the roads of the south of the captaincy in heavily armed groups. It also recorded the audacity of the indigenous groups that started to attack the farms located east of the road and the tax collection office (Registro) by the Iguaçú river (BRASIL, 1891).

The situation described in the Royal Charter synthesized the war context on the borders of the occupation in southern Brazil. It also revealed the inefficacy of other means applied to the incorporation of the indigenous populations in the “civilization” environment, and how useless the “defensive war” had been as the tools used by the government of the captaincy to stop the indigenous attacks. For this and other reasons, D. João VI said he was forced to “suspend the effects of the humanity towards the indigenous peoples that he had previously ordered” and told the governor of the captaincy of São Paulo to start a war against the Gê tribes of the South – Kaingang and Xokleng – “First and foremost, as soon as you receive this Royal Charter, you must consider the war against those barbarians indigenous peoples started” (Carta Régia de 05/11/1808) (BRASIL, 1891).

The Royal Charter was not only a simple war declaration against the indigenous tribes. It was also an instrument used by the São Paulo government and the rural elites to continue the process of expanding their farms inside the Kaingang and Xokleng territories. After declaring the war and authorizing the capture of indigenous individuals as slaves for a period of up to 15 years by the militias and/or residents taking part in it, the Charter presented other guidelines that should be followed by the government of São Paulo. It authorized the concession of *sesmarias* in the newly conquered territories to those who had “resources”, without any charge other than the obligation to plant cereals and create livestock farms. It ordered the payment to João Floriano da Silva “of a competent salary”, since he had been appointed by D. João VI, “Intendant of the Culture of the Campos de Guarapuava”. João Floriano was José Felix da Silva’s brother, and the latter was the most prosperous and important farmer in the Campos Gerais at that time. He was appointed for the “assessment of that land”, that is, he should decide the concession of *sesmarias* and “propose whatever he found convenient for the development of its good culture”. The governor França e Horta should listen to him regarding

war policy against the indigenous population, see Sposito (2009) and Paraiso (2014); and for the revocation of the Royal Charters that declared war against the indigenous tribes in Minas Gerais and São Paulo by D. João VI’s Court, see Sposito (2011).

any topic linked to the task of conquering Guarapuava. The Royal Charter also defined the concession of new *sesmarias* by the brothers João and José da Silva, to the lieutenant-colonel Francisco José de Sampaio Peixoto, and to the lieutenant-colonel Manoel Gonçalves Guimarães. Finally, it addressed the Court's most immediate interests: the control of the precious stones that might be discovered by the Royal Revenue – “publish that all and any diamond that might be found must be immediately delivered at the Royal Revenue Office” (Carta Régia de 05/11/1808) (BRASIL, 1891).

The Court knew that José Felix da Silva had amassed a fortune with the diamonds found in the Tibagi river, therefore, the possibility of the discovery of new diamond mines in that river was real. This fact resulted in the express determination that any topic related to such precious stones would be under the Royal Revenue control.

The conquest of the Kaingang territories in Guarapuava was inserted in the interest of the social subjects that ruled the region at that moment. As stated by Moreira (2021, p. 8): “In the Royal Charter that decreed war against the Kaingang, there was another political logic in operation, which was manifested in a very different language that was much more connected to the economic interests of that period”. Those were the interests of the rural elite of the 5th District, who wanted to expand their farms and aimed at safety for the cattle business on the roads and livestock farms; the interests of the captaincy of São Paulo, whose government wanted to keep and, if possible, increase tax collection from the cattle business coming from the south; and the interests of the empire, which in addition to increasing the tax collection and strengthening the rural elite who served it, saw the possibility of discovering new diamond mines and expand the empire occupation to the margins of the rivers Paraná and Uruguay, removing the threat of invasion by the “Castilians”. At the other end of this tug-of-war, the Kaingang and Xokleng were found fighting a war on the borders of the occupation to defend their territories.

As soon as the governor of São Paulo received the Royal Charter, he ordered its publication in all villages of the captaincy (DI, 58:74). Less than two months after it had been published, on 16th January 1809, the government of the captaincy of São Paulo sent a letter to lower ranked captains with instructions to implement the war against the indigenous tribes in the captaincy. They summoned volunteers who “had the resources to arm themselves and march against those they could chase, and the indigenous individuals that were

captured should be considered war prisoners for 15 years” (DI, 58:73). The volunteers in the war against the “native peoples” would be entitled to enslave all those they had captured. The letters sent by the government of São Paulo did not mention the land distribution issue. That was a topic to be treated with the brothers João and José Felix da Silva, who had direct connections with the Court.

The historiography still discusses the reasons that led the Court to declare war against the indigenous tribes in the captaincy of São Paulo and resume the actions to conquer Guarapuava. In a favorable perspective, the actions of D. João VI’s Court (NORONHA, 2021, p. 376) are related to the “indigenous hostility” against Afonso Botelho’s Expedition in 1773, as the justification for the “war declaration against the Bugres in Guarapuava”, expressed in the Royal Charter of November 1808. In the regional historiography, the historian Davi Carneiro from Paraná defends the idea that the “beautiful fields” of the District of Curitiba might “provoke the Castilanos’ envy”. Therefore, “D. João devised an expedition to effectively take property, [...] since the rich Campos de Guarapuava had been abandoned since Afonso Botelho’s retreat” (CARNEIRO, 1942, p. 72). This idea of an external threat by the Castilanos and the need for closing the south-southeast border of the captaincy continued to haunt the historians in the Paraná state (BALHANA; MACHADO; WESTPHALEN, 1969) and became one of the most usual explanations of the regional historiography for the Royal Expedition of Conquest of Guarapuava.

More recent historiographic interpretations establish differences between the Royal Charter of 1808 and that of April 1809. Some of these interpretations defend that the second Charter of April 1809 was milder and presented a “softer discourse with the indigenous peoples”, it adopted a “more moderate tone” than the “fierce tone of the November Charter” (LEITE, 2008, p. 172). It seemed to present a “wider plan for populating[...] with a softer approach in relation to the indigenous inhabitants” (PONTAROLO, 2021, p. 140). It seemed to have incorporated Jose de Arouche Toledo Rendon’s ideas about how to treat the native inhabitants (LEITE, 2010, p. 35-38); or even that D. João VI had changed his “just war” discourse, which had been adopted in the Charter of November 1808, into a “softer speech” (LOURENÇO, 2010, p. 63), a “more moderate discourse”, (DURAT, 2019, p. 75), in the Charter of April 1809.

From our point of view, the Charter of November 1808 was the strategy adopted by the Court to face the war situation on the Viamão road and the occupation borders, while the Royal Charter of April 1809 was the Operational

Plan to occupy the Campos de Guarapuava, prepared by the Royal Expedition Board. The Royal Charter of April 1809 confirmed the ideas of conquering indigenous territories and transforming their “barbarians” inhabitants into “civilized” beings, and in the event of resistance to these purposes, D. João VI authorized the use of “brute force with those that offended the king’s subjects and resisted to the mild measures of civilization offered to them” (Carta Régia de 01/04/1809)¹⁴ (BRASIL, 1891).

We understand that the policy to conquer new indigenous territories was a claim by the regional rural elite and was thoroughly treated by the governor França e Horta, who realized that the arrival of the Portuguese Court in Brazil was the best moment to implement such demand. Kaingang and Xokleng tribes were fighting the war on the borders of the occupation and that hampered the businesses and tax collection in the region. It was necessary to remove them from the villages and roads where the cattle drivers had to pass with the cattle to be traded. However, for the conquest and incorporation of new indigenous territories to the farm expansion process, large scale action was needed in coordination with the captaincy government in tune with the empire government and supported by the rural elites of the south of the captaincy.

The Royal Expedition of Conquest of Guarapuava: planning and organization to invade and occupy the Kaingang territories in *Koran-bang-rê*¹⁵

At the same time that the captains of the villages were instructed to fight a war against the indigenous tribes, the governor França e Horta started to organize the Royal Expedition of Conquest of Guarapuava. His first measure was the creation of the Royal Expedition Board in the early 1809. He was self-appointed president, and the members were the deputies João José da Costa Ferreira and José Arouche de Toledo Rendon¹⁶ (MACEDO, 1951); the

¹⁴For the interpretation that the Royal Charter of April 1809 confirmed the instructions of military action against the indigenous groups already presented in the Royal Charter of November 1808, see Larissa Biato de Azevedo (2015, p. 59; 110).

¹⁵Regarding the Royal Expedition, two books were published by historians from Paraná, who descended from the commander Diogo Pinto. The first was written by Arthur Martins Franco, *Diogo Pinto e a Conquista de Guarapuava*, and published in 1943; while the second was written by Francisco R. Azevedo de Macedo, *Conquista pacífica de Guarapuava*, in 1951. Both praise the participation of Diogo Pinto as commander of the Royal Expedition.

¹⁶Deputy Rendon had been appointed in 1798 by the governor of São Paulo, Antonio Manoel de Mello Castro e Mendonça, as the General Director of the Indigenous Tribes in the captaincy of São Paulo. He was in

deputy João Vicente da Fonseca was the secretary. In the following month, the commander of the Militia of Curitiba, Diogo Pinto de Azevedo Portugal, was summoned to go to São Paulo to expose his ideas related to the organization of the Royal Expedition to the Board¹⁷.

Having met in São Paulo, Diogo Pinto and the Board elaborated the plans for the invasion and occupation of the Kaingang territories in Guarapuava. These plans included the details of instructions of how to proceed, and they resulted in the elaboration of a new Royal Charter on 1st April 1809.

The Royal Expedition Command

The second measure was the appointment of Diogo Pinto de Azevedo Portugal commander of the Royal Expedition of Conquest of Guarapuava. Those were express orders coming from the Court, who acknowledged his participation in Afonso Botelho's campaigns in the Campos de Guarapuava. Through the Royal Warning of 1st December 1808, D. João VI ordered the governor of São Paulo to employ him in the "diligence of the opening of Campos de Guarapuava" (DI, 58:94). At the time, França e Horta determined the written report of all ideas Diogo Pinto might have about the opening of the way to Guarapuava (DI, 58:94).

Born in Parqueiros Village, in Portugal, he was 22 years old when he joined the army in Santos and was summoned to join Afonso Botelho's expeditions in Paraná (DI, 28:117-118). In 1773, he was listed as aggregate soldier with a 11\$400 (eleven thousand four hundred *reis*) salary for six months of service rendered (DI, 33:95-96)¹⁸.

charge of "an inspection visit" to the tribes. As a result of such visits, he elaborated a "Plan proposing the Improvement of the Indigenous people's fate by transforming their tribes into parish organizations, and extinguishing that name and their separation from the local community that had been adopted for over two centuries", written in 1802. The Plan was published in the DI, 95:91-107. Afterwards, it was reformulated and published with the title "Memória sobre as aldeias de índios da província de São Paulo" [Memory of the Indigenous Tribes in the Province of São Paulo] on the RIHGB, in 1842 (RENDON, 1842). For an analysis of Rendon's propositions, see Petrone (1995), Monteiro (2001), and Azevedo (2015), among others.

¹⁷ In the war declaration against indigenous populations of the Doce river Valley, the Board for the Civilization and Conquest of Indigenous Populations and Navigation of the Doce river was also created, with the purpose of proposing to the Prince Regent "everything he thought was convenient [...] for the indigenous individuals' pacification, civilization, and organization in tribes" (Carta Régia de 13/04/1808) (BRASIL, 1891). For an analysis of this Board, see Silva; Moreira (2006).

¹⁸ Diogo Pinto died on 01/05/1820 in his country house in the neighborhood of Carrapatos, where he was buried on 03/05/1820, at the Main Church of Castro/PR, as informed by Antônio da Rocha Loures in a letter sent to the governor of the captaincy of São Paulo, João Carlos Augusto de Oyenhausen-Gravenburg, on 12/05/1820 (LOURES, 1820).

After having taken part in Botelho's campaigns in the "sertões do Tibagi", as the region in the west of the Castro Village was known at the time, Diogo Pinto continued in his military career. In January 1790, he took part in the mission to arrest cattle thieves in Lages Village/SC (DI, 45:239). He continued to ascend in the military career and in February 1790 was promoted from lieutenant of riflemen to lieutenant of fireman (DI, 45:117), and in August of the same year, he was made captain (DI, 45:118). Five years later, in February 1795, he was promoted captain of firemen (DI, 45:112). In August 1797, the governor of the captaincy of São Paulo, Antonio Manoel de Mello Castro e Mendonça, appointed Diogo Pinto to occupy the position of major of the Cavalry Militia of Curitiba, "for having served several years with good acceptance by the higher ranked army colleagues, and showing the necessary aptitude for this position" (DI, 29:18-19).

In February 1804, Diogo Pinto attended a hearing with the governor of the captaincy at the time, António José França e Horta (DI, 55:248). In the following year, he was ordered to arrest criminals that had escaped from Santos and could be in Curitiba village (DI, 56:286). In the early 1807, he was sent to populate the stretch from São José dos Pinhais to Guaratuba (DI, 57:137-138) and received new orders in Paranaguá (DI, 57:138-139; 181). In February 1808, he was in charge of opening the Graciosa road, linking the Curitiba plateau to the coast (DI, 57:195; 241-244; 306).

With the experience he acquired in the Campos de Guarapuava with Afonso Botelho, and a long list of services rendered to the authorities of the captaincy, being appointed by the Court, Diogo Pinto became the right-hand man of França e Horta and was summoned to work in São Paulo with the Board in the plans to organize the Royal Expedition.

Organization of Troops

After having appointed the general commander of the Royal Expedition, the governor França e Horta started to send orders for the organization of the troops of soldiers. On 15th April 1809, he ordered the colonel José Vaz Carvalho to select soldiers from the militia in Curitiba. The governor offered some advantages for those willing to participate and ordered that "those who joined the force should earn sixty reis a day and supplies for themselves and their families (which they could take with them) for a year, while they were implementing the agriculture there" (DI, 58:126-127). In addition to the salary, they could have a share in the distribution of the "indigenous individuals that

were made war prisoners to serve them for fifteen years” (DI, 58:126-127), as provided for in the Royal Charter of 05/11/1808 (BRASIL, 1891). Those that settled down with their families in agricultural properties would not pay taxes in the first eight years, would have their debts with the Royal Revenue written off, and would not be summoned to fight in the war campaigns in Rio Grande do Sul. The commander Carvalho was ordered to choose the most able 200 soldiers and another 12 that could saw and work with wood, who would have a monthly salary of 3,000 *reis*. They would all obey lieutenant-colonel Diogo Pinto de Azevedo Portugal’s orders (DI, 58:126-127).

The governor of the captaincy also ordered José Pedro Galvão de Moura Lacerda, lieutenant-colonel of the Hunters Troop of Santos, to organize and send troops to serve the Royal Expedition in Guarapuava. “As soon as you receive this letter, send the troops appointed for the Guarapuava Expedition so that we can embark to Paranaguá” (DI, 58:148-149). Lieutenant-colonel Lacerda also informed that the commander Diogo Pinto was going to the Santos Harbor to supervise the embark of troops. He also warned his subordinate that they should not create any obstacles to the onboarding of troops; in the event of lack of equipment, uniforms, or other supplies, they would be sent later on.

Moreover, the governor of the captaincy authorized the commander Diogo Pinto to recruit new candidates to substitute the soldiers that might die during the expedition (DI, 58:201-202). In the event of desertions, colonel Candido Xavier de Almeida, who was also a commander in Santos, was told to hear the reasons presented by the deserters and inform him about them, and while a decision was not made by him, Almeida should keep them in prison (DI, 58:207)¹⁹. In addition to possible deaths and desertions, there were also individuals that were not fit for the job. Those were soldiers with some diseases, or some considered troublemakers, who could not continue in the Royal Expedition (DI, 58:307-308).

Aiming at choosing the best individuals to join the troops, and at the same time, worried about not leaving more remote villages unprotected and threatened, the governor França e Horta recommended that Diogo Pinto should not recruit men from the Príncipe village (current Lapa/PR) or Lajes/SC. In those villages, he should only “recruit people if there were no more

¹⁹ About the desertion of soldiers from the Royal Expedition, there are several documents addressing the topic in the Public Archive of the state of São Paulo, at the back of the Civil House Government Secretary, under the title *Ordenanças, ofícios e mapas* (Orders, Letters, and Maps) for Curitiba, Guaratuba, Lapa, and Guarapuava.

options, even because they were surrounded by barbarian indigenous groups and would have to be defended from them” (DI, 58:339-340).

Appointment of religious Leaders to accompany the Expedition

The governor França e Horta was advised by the bishop of São Paulo in his choice of the priests that would accompany the troops. The priests Francisco das Chagas Lima²⁰ and Pedro Nollasco were appointed. They would have to assist all Christians that joined the Royal Expedition; and once settled in Guarapuava, they should start the catechesis of the indigenous groups.

The priest Francisco das Chagas Lima, at that time, 1809, was already well-known for this work in the catechesis of Puri indigenous tribes in the newly created village of São João de Queluz in the valley of Rio Paraíba in 1798 (DI, 29:218). The appointment of priest Francisco das Chagas Lima as supervisor of the indigenous catechesis in Guarapuava occurred in March 1809, after approval by the bishop of São Paulo.

To: Priest Franco, das Chagas
I am sending the provisions and the letter that the honorable bishop sent to me approving your appointment as the supervisor of the catechesis for the indigenous population in Gurapuava, [...] S. Paulo 5th March 1809. Signed by Antonio Joze da Franca e Horta = To Pe. Franco, das Chagas Lima (DI, 58:139).

In the same communication, the governor França e Horta informed that he had already sent the provisions and the bishop’s letter to friar Pedro Nollasco, appointing him to serve in the expedition.

A month later, on 15th April, França e Horta wrote a flattering letter reinforcing the invitation to priest Chagas Lima and to priest Jezuino de Monte Carmelo to help in the tasks of

[...] catechizing, baptizing and instructing the indigenous tribes in the principles of our faith, and at the same time the commander should guarantee that no violence would be committed against those indigenous individuals that were peaceful and agreed to live in villages ruled by the empire and that did not

²⁰The priest Francisco das Chagas Lima was born in Curitiba in 1757 and from 1800 to 1809 worked in the catechesis of Puri indigenous tribes in the Village of São João de Queluz, in São Paulo. After that, he went to Guarapuava in 1809, where he stayed until October 1828. He then returned to the valley of Rio Paraíba/SP, where he died in 1832.

offer resistance when they were made to work on their land (DI, 58:124-126).

He also informed the priests Jezuino and Chagas Lima that D. João VI had determined that he could spend resources totaling

[...] ten thousand *reis* a month, and supplies for yourselves, and your whole families for the time you remain in this ministry, in addition to other advantages that you might expect from the King's generosity. God bless you. S. Paulo 15th April 1809. Signed by Antonio Jose da Franca e Horta = To Priest Jezuino do Monte Carmello. — A similar letter was sent to Priest Franco, das Chagas Lima (DI, 58:124-126).

Sending indigenous individuals as interpreters in the Royal Expedition

With these procedures, they gathered the human resources needed to conquer the region. However, one of the concerns of the commander of the Royal Expedition and the authorities of the captaincy was how they would communicate with the indigenous population when they arrived in Guarapuava. Bearing that in mind, in April 1809, the governor ordered the captain of Curitiba village to verify the news about the presence of indigenous individuals in the village that could be employed as interpreters in the expedition.

It was reported that a cattle driver called Manuel Joaquim went from that city to the Campos Gerais with an indigenous individual coming from Lages that knew the Brazilian language. So, you must ask where that indigenous individual is and prepare him for the Guarapuava Expedition, as well as the female indigenous individual that lives at Maria do Rozario's home, if she knows the Brazilian language (DI, 58:127).

As reported, at that time, there were *bandeiras* chasing and arresting Kaingang groups in the territories located in the west of Sorocaba. Therefore, when the *bandeira* led by Salvador da Rocha Camargo chased and arrested some of them in the districts of Itapetininga and Itapeva, in the first half of 1809, those prisoners were summoned to work as interpreters as ordered by the governor França e Horta in September of that year.

To the Captain of Itapeva village.

We really need some indigenous individuals that can be interpreters in the Guarapuava Expedition. I order that from the indigenous group that was arrested by Captain Salvador da Rocha Camargo, four must be sent to lieutenant-colonel Diogo Pinto, Commander of that expedition (DI, 58:202).

Moreover, in the event of any of these captured indigenous individuals being owned by somebody, França e Horta authorized the indemnification of their owners, and the payment of transport and food for them until they were delivered to the expedition commander. The resources for this expenditure could be taken from the Royal Revenue vaults (DI, 58:202).

Some time later, when the Royal Expedition was already installed in the Atalia Fort, the recruitment of Kaingang speakers continued so that they could be interpreters in the Campos de Guarapuava.

This one will be delivered to you by Joze da Silva Guimarães, and will work as an interpreter in the occupation, the indigenous interpreter with the usual salary;

God bless you. S. Paulo 6th September 1810 —

Signed by Antonio José da Franca, e Horta — To: Lieutenant-colonel Diogo Pinto de Azevedo Portugal – Commander of the Guarapuava Expedition (DI, 59:53-54).

Other professionals that should join the Royal Expedition

An expedition of the size of the one that was being prepared had to take specialist workers in several types of work such as herders, who specialized in transport animals and the equipment needed; locksmiths and carpenters, who could choose suitable wood and work with it to build up huts, bridges, provisional camps, and warehouses to store food, and after arriving in Guarapuava, they would have to build a Fort to protect the soldiers and the civil population, houses for the army officers and civilians, and a chapel to hold religious ceremonies; blacksmiths to produce and keep tools; and a surgeon, who would provide medical care and organize medication distribution.

In May 1809, José Pedro Galvão de Moura, commander of the Troop of Hunters of Santos, notified the governor França e Horta that a blacksmith from the village had offered to join the Guarapuava expedition. That blacksmith

could also work as a locksmith and promised to take his nephew who could also work in these activities (DI, 58:138). A month later, the same blacksmith was said to have fled and did not go onboard the ship that would take the troops to Paranaguá, either for being afraid of the dangers to be faced or for not agreeing with the salary proposed. When França e Horta heard about this fact, he ordered the authority of Santos to arrest the said blacksmith as soon as he got there and send him to Paranaguá, where the local authorities had been instructed to send him to Guarapuava, delivering him to the commander Diogo Pinto (DI, 58:168). The reports of the time suggest that it was not only the blacksmith who disappeared from Santos fearing the adventure in Guarapuava, since his nephew, who had been appointed as a locksmith was no longer found, as reported by the Santos commander.

To Lieutenant-colonel Governor of Santos
I have been informed by the Commander of the Guarapuava Expedition that they are in urgent need for a locksmith, [...] Therefore, my orders are for you to ask whether one would voluntarily join that expedition, and when you find someone, take the measures to send him immediately.
São Paulo, 6th September 1809. — signed by Antonio Jozé da Franca e Horta To: Mr. Franco. Jozé da Sa., Lieutenant-colonel with the governor of Santos. (DI, 58:198).

The men who specialized in the equipment and dealing with the transport animals and horse riding were hired in Curitiba village. The captain of the village was in charge of

[...] hiring for that expedition 6 proactive men who could harness the animals of the troops, each one earning a monthly salary of 2,400 *reis* plus supplies for their families, and they should be ready to follow the orders given by the lieutenant colonel Diogo Pinto de Azeredo Portugal.
God bless you. São Paulo 15th April 1809.
Signed by Antonio José da Franca e Horta. To Mr. Antonio Ribro de Andrade, Captain of Curitiba village (DI, 58:126-127).

In addition to the soldiers and those specialized workers, they also needed to gather workforce for general services. França e Horta wrote to the captains of Curitiba, Castro, and Príncipe (Lapa) villages, asking for some help with slaves and cattle (DI, 58:152), thus, the documents indicate the presence of slaves, men, and women in the expedition.

The Royal Expedition Weaponry

The logistics of the Royal Expedition focused on the weaponry as one of the items of utmost importance. The governor of the captaincy was personally responsible for the organization of the arms that should be destined to the expedition. In May 1809, he notified the Paranaguá commander that as soon as the six artillery pieces arrived, he should destine them

One to Iguape, and another to Cananea; keeping two that would be sent to the militia training, and the other two and all the other equipment received to the Guarapuava expedition and make them available to the lieutenant colonel Diogo Pinto, commander of that expedition (DI, 58:141).

In addition to the two artillery pieces (canons), the governor notified Diogo Pinto that he would receive 150 guns that were guarded by the Paranaguá government (DI, 59:113).

Organization of Supplies

Orders were also given regarding the organization of supplies. The preparation started at the Warehouse of the Santos army, from where they would be shipped to Paranaguá. The order given by the governor França e Horta to the warehouse clerk Salvador Bitancourt was “you must have the supplies ready as soon as possible for shipment: therefore, all the supplies must be sent to the expedition to feed all those joining the expedition” (DI, 58:149-150). In addition to the uniforms prepared for the army staff, the supplies to feed them and some “iron” should be shipped to Paranaguá. The governor asked the warehouse clerk to send “the list of items removed from the warehouse” (DI, 58:149-150) and determined that everything that had been bought should be ready for shipment under the supervision of the commander Diogo Pinto.

The food for the soldiers that embarked in Santos heading to Paranaguá and from there to Curitiba, and following to the final destination in Guarapuava, was one of the most complex items in the logistics of troop displacement. What kind of food should be prepared and served to the troops? Verifying the list of items shipped to Santos, we found: salted meat, which might “go bad very soon”, that is that could spoil in a short period of time, but the basic item of food “to nourish the soldiers onboard would be beans

and bacon”. They also had to take “cauldrons, [...], bowls”, and other kitchen utensils to prepare it, (DI, 58:162).

Organization of the logistics of the troops Journey and transport of equipment and supplies,

The transport of troops, weaponry, ammunition, and supplies from Santos to Paranaguá was by ship. In Paranaguá, new troops, weaponry, ammunition and food were added and followed to the Antonina Harbor, and from there they were sent to Curitiba village on horse back through the Graciosa road, in a two and a half day journey (PORTUGAL, 1809). Therefore, they required a new logistics for the transport of troops and the weaponry to Curitiba and from there to Guarapuava. For this reason, the governor França e Horta contacted the sergeant of Castro village, Luciano Carneiro Lobo, and told him to organize the troops of animals prepared for this transport. The sergeant contacted the farmers of Campos Gerais, but not all of them were willing to provide animals for the Royal Expedition. One of them was the farmer Jose Felix da Silva, the wealthiest among them, who replied to the sergeant with a negative, that reply was informed to the governor França e Horta who reacted immediately:

To: Joze Feliz da Silva.

I have heard of the letter you sent to sergeant Luciano Carneiro Lobo on 25th July replying to the letter he had sent you asking for some animals to transport some supplies by the Royal Revenue destined to the Garapuava Expedition, in which you explained that you needed those animals for your own service and your brother's the Intendent of Culture of those fields when you have to go there and discussed Royal orders, which do not intend to force those that are unwilling and take their property destining it to that expedition (DI, 58:218).

França e Horta did not accept Jose Felix's excuses and replied by saying that he was surprised with the lack of compliance with the orders originated in the Court, and event threatened to inform the emperor about his negative answer: “I am surprise by your intention of having the authority to interpret the Royal Law and my orders, and I will have to inform the king your reprehensible behavior so that you are punished according to his decision” (DI, 58:218).

To overcome the resistance of the province elite in Paraná, França e Horta told the captain of Curitiba that:

[...] observing the Royal Orders given by the Prince Regent, lieutenant-colonel aggregate to the Army and assistant of orders of the admiral, Sir Sidney Smith João Jacome Baumann came to this captaincy and shall inspect all the troops, [...]. I order you to give all help needed and asked by him, so that he can perform his duty, and at the same time, you shall inform the commander of the militia troops to be ready and to present to inspection to the said lieutenant-colonel inspector, at the place and time he shall determine.

God bless you. São Paulo, 15th April 1809.

Signed by: Antonio José da Franca e Horta. To: Mr. Anto. Ribro. de Andrade, Captain of Curitiba village (DI, 58:124-125).

The presence of high ranked Court members to inspect the troops that would follow under the commander Diogo Pinto's orders, seems to have reduced local resistance.

After the threat presented by the governor, in the mid-1809, the farmer Jose Felix da Silva seems to have assisted the Court, because a year later, he was praised for his services to the expedition with the animals and supplies that transported and nourished the employees of that Expedition.

To: Sergeant Jozé Felis.

[...] I was informed of the great zeal and liberality with which you have served the Expedition, by donating supplies to feed the employees, and animals for the necessary transport, and it is my duty, due to the position I hold, to praise those that so worthily support the Royal Service; for this reason, I assure you that I shall always remember your good service, and I really wish to have other occasions on which I can honor you in the presence of the Prince Regent for having behaved as a true faithful subject of the king. God bless you. S. Paulo 27th September 1810 — signed by: Antonio Joze da Franca, e Horta — To: Mr. Sergeant Joze Feliz (DI, 59:76).

The Royal Expedition Funding

An expedition of the size of the one being prepared to invade and incorporate territories, arrest and enslave the Kaingang tribes, required

considerable financial resources that were not owned by the captaincy or the Court to make available immediately. Therefore, they decided to create a specific tax with this purpose at the Registro de Sorocaba (tax office).

[...] I hereby order, that for a period of 10 years the Registro de Sorocaba shall charge a new tax of 200 *reis* in the first five years for each head of cattle, both meat cattle and horses, which go through such office in Registro (Carta Régia de 01/04/1809)²¹ (BRASIL, 1891).

However, the tax charge result would only enter the cashier of the Registro de Sorocaba after the first troops had gone through, that is after April 1809, and the Royal Expedition needed the money to pay the first expenses immediately. Thus, the governor França e Horta contacted lieutenant-colonel Antonio Francisco de Andre, the future tax charger, and asked a loan, as an advance of the tax that would be charged, for the payment of the immediate expenses of the Expedition.

To: Lieutenant-colonel Anto. Franco, de André.

[...] This is to ask you the advancement of some money so that we can pay the immediate expenses of the expedition, which shall be repaid as soon as the taxes are received; I shall be extremely grateful for this service, and I shall praise you and inform the Prince Regent so that our king shall give the prize you deserve. I also expect to be informed about the money I can be supported with, you can send such information through the bearer of this letter. God bless you. São Paulo 14th April 1809. Signed by: Antonio Jozé da Franca e Horta. To: Lieutenant-colonel Antonio Franco, de André (DI, 58:124).

In addition to the taxes defined in the Royal Charter, the governor of the captaincy asked the farmers of the villages of Castro, Curitiba, and Príncipe for contributions to the Royal Expedition. The first request mentioned slaves to help to open roads that would link the Campos Gerais to Guarapuava. Next, animals for transport and meat animals were also asked to transport things and feed the soldiers and workers. To poor dwellers that did not own land, the governor informed that they could contribute with some work, and could donate flour and beans, which were necessary for the nourishment of the participants of the Royal Expedition (DI, 58:152).

²¹ Para maiores detalhes sobre a criação, revogação e recriação dos impostos destinados ao financiamento da Real Expedição, ver Petrone (1976, p. 141-150).

Somebody had to keep the record of the accounting of the expedition. A lot of equipment had been bought, as well as several supplies, and the salaries of the troops had to be paid. The colonel Manoel Gonçalves Guimarães was appointed the “bookkeeper” of the Royal Expedition. It seems relevant to mention that he had had a hearing with the governor França e Horta, in 1805, to discuss the “conquest, or better, civilization of the native people of Garapuava” (DI, 56:153). Being a rich businessman in Curitiba village and owning *sesmarias* in the old way from Campos Gerais to Guarapuava, colonel Manoel Gonçalves Guimarães became responsible for the purchase and payments in the Royal Expedition. One of his first tasks, as determined by the Board, was to pay the salaries of the Royal Expedition troops from May to December 1809, totaling 600 thousand *reis* a month (ARQUIVO NACIONAL, 1809, p. 3).

In addition to all the measures listed above, the governor França e Horta also addressed several other topics with captain Diogo Pinto throughout 1809. These included claims from people he trusted, from the commander, appointment of people for certain positions in the Expedition; complaints by the army members against their bosses in the expedition, and one subject that was always in the correspondence referred to the best way to be followed to reach the Campos de Guarapuava. The governor França e Horta always wanted that the commander Diogo Pinto kept him informed of all events that might happen during the expedition work (DI, 58:215-216).

Going to *Koran-bang-rê* - Guarapuava

On 3rd June 1809, Diogo Pinto was at the Santos Harbor to supervise the embark of troops, equipment, and supplies that would follow to the Paranaguá Harbor. The ships would sail on 10th June. Seven days later, he was in Paranaguá waiting for the Pinque São Caetano (ship), which would bring the troops. When the ship landed, other equipment and supplies were embarked and it followed to the Antonina Harbor, where it arrived on the 24th June. Once the São Caetano ship had been unloaded at the warehouses, the cargo started to be prepared in smaller volumes to be sent to Curitiba on wagons, on horseback, and from there to the military accommodations that were being built along the way to the Campos de Guarapuava. And this is the beginning of another history²².

²² The Journey of the Royal Expedition from Antonina, its installation in the Campos de Guarapuava in the mid-1810, up to the capture of the first Kaingang group, in January 1812, is addressed in Lúcio Tadeu Mota (2022).

Conclusion

We sought to demonstrate that the Royal Charters of 5th November 1808 and 1st April 1809 were a reaction from the D. João VI's Court against the Kaingang and Xokleng tribes, who started a war to defend their territories and their way of life on the borders of the occupation. That offensive was based on the interests of the rural elite that aimed at safety to their cattle business and the expansion of their farms within the indigenous territories located in the western part of the Castro and Ponta Grossa villages. Also, the “plan to populate the Campos de Guarapuava and civilize the barbarian indigenous that infested that territory”, devised in the Royal Charter of April 1809, was thoroughly designed and organized, from the definition of sources of funding, troop organization, transport logistics, weaponry and supplies, to the appointment of its commander.

The conquest of Kaingang territories in Guarapuava was a way of meeting the requirements of the social subjects acting in that region at that time. The rural elite that wanted to expand their farms and aimed at securing their cattle business on the roads and farms where they raised the cattle. The government of the captaincy of São Paulo who wanted to keep, and if possible, increase tax collection with the cattle business that traded animals coming from the south of the country. The empire government that in addition to increasing tax collection and strengthening the rural elite that served it, saw the possibility of finding new diamond mines and extend the empire occupation to the margins of the rivers Paraná and Uruguay, removing the threat of invasion by the “castilanos”.

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